Given a shared EPR pair, two cooperative parties can obtain one bit of shared secret key by separately measuring the pair along the same basis. Apparently, the Holevo bound [1] suggests that they cannot obtain more than one secret bit per shared EPR pair. Here we show that they can do so by independently putting each of their EPR pairs in a Hilbert subspace which is unknown to the eavesdropper. We also prove the unconditional security of a practical prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme based on this principle and derive its key rate in the one-way communication setting.
In a prepare-and-measure-based quantum key distribution (PM-QKD) protocol, the sender Alice prepares a quantum state and sends it through an insecure channel to the receiver Bob, who measures the received state so as to establish a shared raw key. Then, they apply classical post-processing to the raw key to distill a secure final key [2] . Thanks to the Shor-Preskill proof [2, 3] , one may show the unconditional security of a PM-QKD by proving the unconditional security of the corresponding entanglement-distillation-based quantum key distribution protocol (ED-QKD). The later protocol is much harder to implement in practice but is conceptually simpler to handle and understand -Alice and Bob simply try to share almost perfect EPR pairs through entanglement distillation before generating the final secret key by measuring their share of each EPR pair along the same basis. Suppose Alice and Bob share a perfect EPR pair immediately before they generate their shared secret key in an ED-QKD scheme. Since Alice and Bob separately see a completely mixed state in the Hilbert space of two dimensions, the Holevo theorem [1] implies that each of them could obtain an accessible classical information of no more than 1 bit after their individual quantum measurements. Thus, they could obtain at most one secret bit per shared EPR pair. Clearly, this bound is tight as it is achieved by the entanglement-distillation-based version [4] of the well-known BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme [5] . So, it appears that sharing 1 EPR pair cannot generate more than 1 bit of shared secret information. Here we explicitly show that this is not true. The trick is to put each shared EPR pair in a Hilbert subspace, which is not known to the eavesdropper Eve, of a larger Hilbert space similar to a recently proposed QKD scheme by Chau [6] .
Let N ≡ 2 n with n ≥ 2 and consider the following ED-QKD scheme.
Alice secretly and randomly picks [a]
∈ GF (N )/GF (2) and λ ∈ GF (N ) * . She prepares the state ī ∈GF (2) 
√ 2, where all arithmetic in the ket state are performance in the finite field GF (N ). She applies the linear transformation L λ |i → |λi for all i ∈ GF (N ) to the second qudit before sending it through an insecure quantum channel to Bob. [9] [10] [11] [12] that could correct the measured spin-flip and phase errors of the channel in step 4. (Note that such a CSS code is constructed using a classical N -ary code C 1 and a classical binary code C 2 obeying {0} ⊂ C 2 ⊂ C 1 via the standard CSS construction. This is possible for a binary code can be regarded as an N -ary code by extending the linear coding space over the field GF (2) to the linear space over the field GF (N ). In fact, we may extend the dual code of the binary code C 2 to an N -ary code with the same minimum distance using the same trick. In this way, C 1 and C 2 can be used to correct spin-flip and phase errors in this noisy and insecure channel, respectively.)
6. Finally, Alice and Bob separately measure each of their share of the almost perfect EPR-like states along the basis B 1 , where
for all λ ∈ GF (N ) * . In this way, they obtain n bits of shared secret key per EPR-like state measured -1 bit comes from the phase informationc and (n − 1) bits come from the value of [a] ∈ GF (N )/GF (2).
We remark that in the absence of noise and Eve, Alice and Bob should get b =c = 0 for each pair of tested quantum particles in step 4. Consider the unitary operation BADD for Alice and Bob to separately add their first qudit to their second qudit in the computational basis. Clearly,
Consider also the unitary operation that acts on the computational basis according to
whereb 0 ∈ GF (2) denotes the constant term of the degree-(n − 1) polynomial expression for b in GF (2)[x]. Clearly, both H ⊗ H and BADD map basis states in B to itself up to an overall phase. Since the error-correction and privacy amplification procedure using the specially designed CSS code in step 5 above involves H ⊗ H, BADD, standard basis measurement plus local quantum operation by Bob only, therefore Alice may push her final measurement forward in time. By the Shor-Preskill argument [3, 8] , we obtain an equally secure PM-QKD scheme.
To find the corresponding channel error estimation method for this equally secure PM-QKD scheme, we consider the linear operators [11, 12] 
for all u ∈ GF (N ), where
is the absolute trace of i. Then
Recall that in our ED-QKD scheme, Alice first prepares the state |Φ ∈ GF (N )/GF (2) andc ∈ GF (2). Hence, our ED-QKD scheme can be reduced to the following equally secure PM-QKD scheme. λ , respectively. They proceed only if the error rate is sufficiently small.
Alice and Bob apply classical error correction and
privacy amplification to their remaining raw keys based on the classical N -ary code C 1 and classical binary code C 2 obeying {0} ⊂ C 2 ⊂ C 1 . Specifically, we denote the (N/2)-ary vector formed by the [a]'s and the binary vector formed by thec's in Alice's remaining raw key by a and c, respectively. Alice announces the error syndromes for C 1 of a and C 2 of c. Bob subtracts them from his corresponding measured error syndromes and then uses the subtracted results to perform classical error corrections using codes C 1 (C 2 ) on his remaining raw key a ′ ( c ′ ). For a sufficiently low noise level, the Bob's raw key after error correction should agree with Alice's. They now use the cosets a + C 1 and c + C 2 as their shared final key.
Note that this scheme is analogous to a recent scheme of Chau in Ref. [6] . The major difference is that the two-dimensional Hilbert subspaces used in state preparation and measurement are not revealed here. And this is the reason why the entanglement-distillation version of the present scheme can generate n secret bits per shared EPR-like pairs. This result does not violate the Holevo bound [1] because each EPR pair is put in a Hilbert subspace that is not known to Bob. Thus, before making his final measurement, Bob sees a 2 n -dimensional completely mixed state for each quantum particle he distilled.
We now discuss the unconditional security of our ED-QKD scheme. Recall that Eve sees the same completely mixed density matrix for the quantum state that Alice sends to Bob in step 1 irrespective of the value of λ used. So the quantum operation ρ → E(ρ) = i K i ρK † i Eve applies to the insecure quantum channel is independent of λ, where each Kraus operator used can be written as 
where the primed sum is over those variables v and/or
,b,c up to an irrelevant phase whenever u = u ′ and Tr(v) = Tr(v ′ ). Combined with Eq. (8), we conclude that Eve's attack through E is equivalent to the quantum operation
† . In this regard, we may interpret e uv as the probability that the qudit has experienced X u Z v in the insecure quantum channel.
Recall that we obtain estimates ofẽ
* andc ∈ GF (2) in step 4 of our ED-QKD scheme. In the infinite key length limit, these estimates are exact. From Eq. n . So quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound [9, 10] tells us that the CSS code needed to perform the entanglement distillation in step 5 of our ED-QKD scheme exists provided that
where the primed sum is over u ∈ GF (N ) and v ∈ GF (N ) obeying Tr(λ
are the two forms of the binary entropy function for classical probability distributions {p i } and {p, 1 − p}, respectively. Note that the first line of Eq. (9) comes from the fact that λ is randomly chosen; and the second h 2 in the first line involves a sum over those Tr(λ −1 v) = 0 because these X λu Z λ −1 v 's, after conjugation by L λ , have the same effect on |Φ [a],0,0 . Note further that we have used Eq. (7) to arrive at the second line. Once the CSS code exists, Alice and Bob can almost surely distill out almost perfect states each in the form |Φ [a] ,0,0 with a rate R = max(0, K/{n(N − 1)}). Here, the rate is defined as the number of provably secure bits distilled divided by n times the number of qudit transferred. The 1/(N − 1) factor is the probability that Alice's λ agrees (color online) The rate of our scheme R = max(K/{n(N − 1)}, 0) as a function of e [a] and ec for n = 2.
with Bob's λ ′ . That is to say, both our ED-QKD and PM-QKD schemes can distill out a secure key provided that Eq. (9) holds for all e uv 's given that they obey the (N − 1) 2 + 1 constraints coming from the measurement statistics in step 4. Clearly, the resultant secret key is composable [13, 14] . This completes our proof of the unconditional security.
In principle, we should study the performance of our QKD scheme using all the (N − 1) 2 + 1 parameters constraining e uv 's. But this approach is not very fruitful. Since the secret key comes from both [a] andc, it makes sense to gauge the performance of our QKD scheme by the key rate as a function of the following two parameters, the average bit error rate ec of thec's and the average dit error rate e [a] of the [a]'s in the raw key. (Note that both ec and e [a] are averaged over λ.) From Eq. (7) and the fact that h 2 is convex, we conclude that K in Eq. (9) attains its minimum when e uv = e λu,λ −1 v for all u, v ∈ GF (N ) and λ ∈ GF (N ) * . Moreover,
, and λ h 2 ( ′ e λu,λ −1 v )/(N − 1) ≤ h 2 (ec). Hence, Fig. 1 plots the key rate R of our scheme for n = 2 using one-way classical communication via Eq. (10) . It shows that our scheme tolerates e [a] + ec < ∼ 0.16, which is much better than the error-tolerant capability of qubit-based PM-QKDs [2, 5, 15] using one-way classical communication although we must stress that direct comparison is not straightforward due to the presence of the extra parameter e [a] and the different Hilbert space dimension of the quantum information carrier used. Whereas for the noiseless case, our key rate is 1/3 which is the same as that of the six-state scheme [15] . The error-tolerant capability of our scheme increases as n increases but with a lower key rate of 1/(N − 1) in the noiseless limit. Balancing these two effects, we believe that our PM-QKD scheme is useful in practice when n is set to 2 or 3.
On the experimental side, the state preparation of this PM-QKD scheme is the same as that by Chau in Ref. [6] . The measurement is a bit more complicated than in Ref. [6] for the present scheme requires complete measurement. It is instructive to investigate the possibility of simplifying the measurement procedure without compromising security.
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